We revisit questions concerning the implications of voting rights for the e¢ ciency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work of Grossman and Hart (1988) , Harris and Raviv (1988) and Blair, Golbe, and Gerard (1989) .
Introduction
We study contests over the control of a …rm with widely dispersed ownership. The focus is on the implications of allowing the sale of votes separately from shares. There is a substantial recent literature arguing that vote buying occurs in practice (albeit indirectly) but we have not discovered a model that fully characterizes and contrasts the equilibrium outcomes with and without vote trading, and that pinpoints the e¤ect on e¢ ciency and on shareholder pro…ts of allowing for separate vote buying. This paper is a direct follow up on the early literature on the allocation of voting rights to shares which goes back to Grossman and Hart (1988) , Harris and Raviv (1988) and Blair, Golbe, and Gerard (1989) . While our basic set-up and the nature of the questions follow this literature, the results obtained are new. A more detailed discussion of the relation to the literature is presented in Section 2 below.
Following the literature, our model features two contestants competing for control-an incumbent and a rival. The rival moves …rst and makes a tender o¤er to the shareholders.
The incumbent responds with a competing o¤er. Then the shareholders simultaneously make their tendering decisions that determine which contestant obtains control. The …rm generates income for its shareholders and a private bene…t for the party in control; the magnitudes of the income and bene…ts depend on the identity of the parties. In addition to outright o¤ers for shares (and for votes when such o¤ers are permitted) we allow the contestants to make either conditional o¤ers (contingent on winning) or restricted o¤ers (placing a cap on the quantity of shares that will be purchased at the announced price).
1 Our main conclusion is that allowing vote buying is harmful in terms of e¢ ciency in all cases (whether or not quantity restrictions are allowed and whether or not conditional o¤ers are allowed). Allowing restricted o¤ers is also harmful to e¢ ciency (whether or not vote buying is allowed). However, allowing conditional o¤ers is not in itself detrimental to e¢ ciency. There are of course other considerations (e.g., the presence of taxation (Blaire et. al. (1989) ) that might associate vote buying with a favorable e¤ect on e¢ ciency. The present work only highlights the costs directly resulting from the forms of contracts allowed. The sharp observations we obtain regarding e¢ ciency no longer hold if we look at the pro…ts of the initial shareholders alone 1 We assume small shareholders to rule out equilibria where they are pivotal, and assume that the competing parties must make identical o¤ers to all shareholders.
(ignoring the bene…ts of control). In particular, there are parameters for which allowing separate vote trading increases shareholder pro…ts, despite being harmful for e¢ ciency.
Besides the substantive insights outlined above, the paper also has a methodological contribution to the analysis of takeover games with a continuum of shareholders. It suggests a way of dealing with the mixed or asymmetric strategies that are crucial for the analysis, develops arguments that facilitate characterization results without fully constructing the set of equilibria and deals with the question of existence. Thus, this contribution provides a fully developed model that can be used to study these and related issues.
The original motivation for our interest was to understand the di¤erence between the acquisition of control in the corporate context and vote buying in elections in the political context. Intuitive discussions tend to view the former activity as e¢ ciency enhancing and the latter as detrimental and it is interesting to understand whether and in what sense this might be true. This question has already been discussed to some extent by Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky (2008) . The present analysis deepens the understanding by emphasizing that, in the corporate arena, the acquisition of control could be associated with e¢ ciency only because shares are traded with the votes. Vote buying alone is not e¢ cient in the corporate context as well. In the political arena there is no natural analog to the trading of shares.
Such an analog would require that each vote-buying party will receive from (or compensate)
the voters who tender their votes to that party any future bene…t (or loss) that those voters enjoy (or su¤er) from the policies implemented by the winning party. Our analysis does imply that when there are such conditional ex-post transfers allowing vote buying would be e¢ ciency enhancing.
Related Literature
As noted the outline of the model and the questions we study are direct continuations of Grossman and Hart (1988; henceforth GH) , Harris and Raviv (1988; henceforth HR) and Blair, Golbe, and Gerard (1989; henceforth BGG) . Both GH and HR considered situations in which di¤erent classes of shares can have di¤erent voting rights and argued that, at least in certain regions of the parameter space, one-share one-vote (1S1V) is an "optimal"structure.
In some sense, our model considers two classes of shares-ordinary shares and pure voting shares. So, the spirit of their results would be perhaps translated to an argument against allowing the separation of votes from shares. BGG is more closely related in that it also considers directly the possibility of separating votes from shares. They argue that, when o¤ers for shares and/or votes can be made contingent on winning, allowing to trade votes separately from shares does not impose any e¢ ciency losses.
All these papers share the same basic structure of tender o¤ers made in sequence to a large population of small shareholders who then make their tendering decisions simultaneously.
While GH and HR end up with seemingly the same conclusion, justifying the one-shareone-vote arrangement, they are in fact quite di¤erent. First, GH de…ne optimality in terms of the ultimate payo¤s to the initial shareholders, while HR de…ne e¢ ciency in terms of the sum of the public value of the …rm and the private control bene…t, so their conclusions di¤er. Second, HR's result is driven by pivot considerations of shareholders, while GH's model precludes such considerations by assumption. So, the underlying environments are di¤erent. We think that pivot considerations are relevant in a situation in which a small number of large shareholders are holding indivisible blocks of shares, whereas ignoring them seems more suitable for a situation in which the shares are widely distributed among many small shareholders.
We thus follow GH in assuming away pivot considerations. We focus on the e¢ ciency notion of HR, but we also provide some results which use GH's notion. One contribution of our paper to the literature is that we provide a complete equilibrium analysis. This entails the construction of the "mixed" equilibrium in a tendering game with a continuum of agents, the precise identi…cation of the re…nements needed to prune away problematic equilibria and the full arguments needed to establish existence. The equilibrium analysis in GH is not complete (it cannot be without the "mixed" equilibrium that we construct) and covers in detail only a certain region of the possible parameter con…gurations. The choice of model and re…nements has also enabled us to generate some sharp and intuitive insights into the e¤ect of vote trading, and of quantity and conditional restrictions. A second contribution is in the substantive results: e¢ ciency obtains without vote buying and quantity restrictions (without the pivotal considerations required in HR's model), and identifying when ine¢ ciency is caused by allowing separate vote trading.
BGG uses the same e¢ ciency notion we do and essentially the same basic model, but reaches the very di¤erent conclusion that with only contingent o¤ers vote trading does not harm e¢ ciency. This is a meaningful conclusion since in the presence of other elements like taxation it might imply that it is bene…cial to allow of vote trading. Our analysis shows that this result does not hold in the natural environment where contenders can make non-contingent o¤ers as well. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989, henceforth BL) analyze a model in which a raider makes a takeover bid (that is not met by an incumbent's response). They develop a model with a …nite number of shareholders and study its limit as the number grows. They contrast this with Grossman and Hart (1980) who analyze the same situation using a model with atomless and non-pivotal shareholders. BL do not de…ne the mixed strategy equilibria of the limit continuum game and hence they do not characterize nor study it directly as we do.
Substantively, BL follow Grossman and Hart (1980) in inquiring how the free rider problem might impede takeover attempts. Our substantive focus is instead on the e¤ect of allowing trading of votes separately from shares.
Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) develop a variant of Grossman and Hart (1980) , based more on Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , wherein the raider has private information and a block of shares (and the incumbent cannot respond to the raiders o¤er). Hirshleifer and Titman use mixed-strategy equilibria in a manner similar to what we do here to fully solve that model.
The Model and Analysis

The model
This is a model of a contest for control of a …rm. Initially, the …rm is controlled by the incumbent management team, I, and the shares of the …rm are spread uniformly across a continuum of identical shareholders denoted by the interval [0; 1]. Each share is bundled with a vote. A rival management team, R, is trying to gain control of the …rm by acquiring from the shareholders the majority of the votes. We will refer to R and I as the contenders.
Under R's control the …rm has value w R > 0, which is the total value of the income accruing to the shareholders, and R has private bene…t b R > 0. Similarly, w I and b I represent the …rm value and private control bene…t under I's control. Thus, if in the end contender k owns a fraction of the shares after having paid to shareholders the total sum of t, then contender k' s payo¤ is w k t + b k if it wins; and it is w j t if j 6 = k wins. When k wins, the payo¤ to a shareholder who was paid z is z + w k if this shareholder still owns the share, and just z if not.
To economize a bit on the taxonomy, we assume that w I + jb I 6 = w R + j 0 b R , for any j; j 0 2 f0; 1; 2g. This implies in particular that in all scenarios the total value is always maximized under the control of a unique contender.
We consider two basic situations with respect to the allowable trades: one where shareholders can tender only shares (bundled with the votes), and one where shareholders may also sell the votes separately (while keeping the shares and hence the income accruing to them). In the former each contender k 2 fI; Rg quotes a price p s k per share; in the latter each quotes a pair of prices (p s k ; p v k ) for full shares (including votes) and for just votes (with no claim to income) respectively. In each of these situations, we consider three scenarios that di¤er in terms of the additional conditions that the contenders may attach to the price o¤ers.
In the basic scenario, the contenders are allowed to make only unrestricted price o¤ers: all the shares tendered to them must be purchased at the quoted prices. In other scenarios the contenders are allowed to qualify their price o¤ers with quantity restrictions and conditions. We will present the details of those scenarios later on when we turn to analyze them. Since the basic model is common to all scenarios, we continue to outline the model using the general term "o¤er" to represent the combination of prices and whatever additional conditions that may accompany them in the di¤erent scenarios. Let F k denote the set of feasible o¤ers, and f k 2 F k denote an individual o¤er, by contender k 2 fI; Rg.
The contenders move in sequence. First, R makes an o¤er f R 2 F R to all shareholders.
Then I responds with an o¤er f I 2 F I to all shareholders. After observing both o¤ers, shareholders make their tendering decisions simultaneously. Finally, R gains control if following the tendering stage it ends up controlling more than 50% of the votes. Otherwise I remains in control. In other words, the status quo is for I to remain in control unless R obtains more votes than I.
Strategies are de…ned in the usual way. A strategy R for R, is a feasible o¤er, R 2 F R ; a strategy I for I prescribes a feasible o¤er as a function of R's o¤er, I : F R ! F I ; a strategy for a shareholder speci…es a tendering decision (whether and which of the o¤ered tendering options to accept) as a function of the o¤ers (f R ; f I ) made by R and I.
A tendering outcome is a four-tuple m = (m An outcome of the tendering subgame following o¤ers f R and f I is a pair (m; ) f R ;f I with 2 (m).
The solution concept 3.2.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the tendering subgame is an outcome (m; ) f R ;f I satisfying the following: (i) If m h k > 0, for h = s or v and k = I or R, then shareholders' expected payo¤ from tendering instrument h to contender k is at least as high as with any other available option. (ii) If some agent does not tender shares nor votes, i.e., P m h k < 1, then shareholders' expected payo¤ from not tendering is at least as high as with any other available option.
For example, when only shares are traded part (i) implies
We emphasize that is determined in equilibrium: enters the optimality conditions for shareholders, and must also be consistent with shareholder behavior ( 2 (m)).
A SPE in the entire game given possible o¤ers in F R ; F I consists of strategies k , k = R, I and for each pair of o¤ers f R ; f I a selection of an equilibrium outcome in the 2 Letting any be feasible when m s R + m v R = 1=2 will be necessary for the existence of equilibrium in the tendering subgame.
Note that m s R + m v R = 1=2 and any can arise as the limit behavior as N ! 1 over a sequence of models with N shareholders who tender to R with an appropriately chosen probability that tends to 1=2 while the winning probability it implies tends to . tendering subgame (m; ) f R ;f I such that neither R nor I can increase the payo¤ it gets in the resulting outcome (m; ) R ; I ( R ) by deviating from its k .
Our solution concept -a re…nement of SPE
Our solution concepts re…nes SPE by imposing two additional requirements. One rules out knife-edge equilibria which rely on shareholder indi¤erence and would not survive perturbations of the game. The other essentially rules out equilibria in the subgame that are Pareto dominated for the shareholders. The formalization of these requirements is as follows.
De…nition 1
The o¤ers f R ; f I are said to be tie-free if p h k 6 = p h j and p s k 6 = p v j + w j for h 2 fs; vg and j 6 = k 2 fR; Ig.
and " > 0, there are tie-free o¤ers (f " R ; f " I ) in an "-neighborhood of f R ; f I and an equilibrium in the tendering subgame following (f To understand our motivation for (2) note that, as is common in voting games, ine¢ ciencies in our model can arise due to coordination failures. Since our purpose is to focus on the ine¢ ciencies due to the trading rules -in particular whether votes can be sold separately, we adopt a re…nement that rules out ine¢ ciencies arising due to coordination failures.
Part (1) of the robustness re…nement pins down how ties are broken.
3 In its absence, tie breaking will not be pinned down uniquely by the equilibrium. For example, consider the scenario in which the contenders may only buy shares at unrestricted prices. Consider a subgame after R o¤ers a price p s R 2 (w I + b I ; w I + 2b I ). If I were to o¤er p s I = p s R then shareholders would be indi¤erent between tendering to I or to R and I would pro…t from this if a bit more than 50% of the shareholders would tender to it, but I would su¤er losses 3 The de…nition of tie-free o¤ers is stated here only in terms of of uncontingent prices p have not yet introduced the notation for contingent o¤ers. But it will apply to them in the same way as we will note again after introducing the required notation in section 6. if all shareholders would tender to it. Thus, in this subgame, there are multiple equilibria that di¤er in how shareholders break ties when they are indi¤erent. This observation distinguishes this model from some other Bertrand-style models in which tie breaking is uniquely determined in equilibrium. The robustness requirement rules out equilibria of the form just mentioned that are clearly knife-edge. It implies, for example, that in the equilibrium in the subgame following the o¤ers p s I = p s R , the shareholders will not tender both to R and to I. Henceforth, when we refer to an equilibrium of the game we mean a robust SPE (except of course when we explicitly refer to SPE or to (Nash) equilibria of the tendering subgame).
Overview of the analysis
The analysis focuses on the contrast between the case where votes can be traded separately and the case where they cannot. As mentioned above, this comparison is conducted in three di¤erent scenarios with respect to the nature of the o¤ers that the contenders may make.
The structure of all the cases however is similar and goes as follows.
Section 8 establishes that in all scenarios there exists an equilibrium. In every case we show that there cannot be an equilibrium in which 2 (0; 1). The conclusion from these two observations is that, in equilibrium, one of the contenders wins with certainty ( = 1 or = 0). It is then relatively straightforward to rule out one of these possibilities, thereby identifying the equilibrium winner for each con…guration of the parameters. This allows us to draw conclusions regarding the overall e¢ ciency of the equilibrium.
By our de…nition, the outcome is e¢ cient if the contender that generates the maximal total value, w k + b k , wins. This de…nition is possibly controversial since the private bene…t might be viewed as illicit gains. We therefore also use these observations, combined with some properties of the contenders'best replies, to comment on the payo¤s that shareholders receive in equilibrium.
Throughout the analysis we stick to the basic scenario outlined above where R must gain control over at least 50% of the votes in order to win. In the appendix we also present results for an alternative scenario in which the contest ends with a vote. Allowing for voting at the end changes the game, because then R does not need to purchase a majority of the votes to obtain control, it is enough that R obtains a majority in the vote at the end. However, the main results are unchanged.
Despite the similarity in the general structures of the proofs, every scenario requires some specialized work, so it is not possible to provide a uni…ed proof. Still to help the reading, we present in the body of the paper only the proofs of the …rst (and simplest) scenario. The proofs for the remaining cases are relegated to the appendix.
Unrestricted and unconditional o¤ers
In this section we consider the simplest trading rule. The contenders' price o¤ers cannot be quantity constrained-they must purchase the entire quantities tendered to them at the prices they quote. The main results of this section are that, when votes cannot be traded separately, the equilibrium outcome is e¢ cient (maximizes w k + b k ), and with vote trading it need not be e¢ cient. We characterize precisely when ine¢ ciency arises if vote trading is allowed. Roughly speaking, the "wrong" contender can win when its private bene…ts are su¢ ciently larger than those of the other contender; vote trading enables it to win even when it is not e¢ cient.
Only shares
In this subsection votes are inseparable from shares. So, a feasible o¤er by contender k = R; I is a price p s k at which it must purchase all shares tendered to it. To gain control R must purchase at least 50% of the shares.
Theorem 1
The contender with the higher total value, w j + b j , wins in all equilibria.
Proof. Follows from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium in which both contenders win with strictly positive probability, i.e., there is no equilibrium with 2 (0; 1).
Proof. Robustness implies that, in any equilibrium, it cannot be that some shareholders sell some shares to I and some to R because any tie-free o¤ers near (p s R ; p s I ) will break the indi¤erence and change the outcome discontinuously. So, if 2 (0; 1) arises at equilibrium, it must be that half the shareholders tender to R and half do not tender at all. Hence p s I p s R , and those who do not tender to R hold out to get the expected value w R + (1 )w I . In such a case
for otherwise either all shareholders would tender to R or not at all. Finally, it also must be that w I p s R since if w I > p s R this equilibrium would fail the Pareto part of robustness since its outcome (and any su¢ ciently close outcome) would be dominated by a strict equilibrium in the tendering subgame in which shareholders do not tender at all.
Let u j denote the pro…t of j = I; R in the equilibrium with 2 (0; 1).
Consider an equilibrium in which 2 (0; 1). 
where the second equality holds by the equilibrium condition (1). Thus, I can deviate pro…tably from the putative equilibrium with 2 (0; 1).
Suppose w
Since this is an equilibrium, I cannot pro…tably outbid R with p
where the …rst equality follows from (1). If 
Both votes and shares
In this scenario votes can be traded separately from shares. The contenders'o¤ers take the form (p Contender I winning with probability 1 is also not an equilibrium, since
Therefore, the only equilibrium is "mixed" with half the shareholders selling shares to R, the other half selling votes to I and p The proof is in the appendix. The method is as before. It is …rst shown that there are no mixed equilibria in which both contenders win with positive probability. Then for each region of the parameter space one of the contenders is eliminated as a possible winner, which leaves the other as the sole candidate for winning. Since existence is assured, this characterization implies the result.
The detrimental e¤ect of vote trading on e¢ ciency is not entirely surprising. If we think for a moment about a situation in which only votes can be traded, 5 then the party j with the higher b j will win and the outcome obviously is not always e¢ cient. When both shares and votes can be traded this e¤ect does not completely disappear.
First and second mover advantages
The characterization in Theorem 2 re ‡ects both a …rst-mover and a second-mover advantage.
Second mover advantage: When w R + b R is not too much larger than w I + b I , then I can win with even a small advantage in private bene…ts, b I > b R . By contrast if
then I wins. So, those situations exhibit a second-mover advantage.
The source of the second-mover advantage is in the ability to make an o¤er that induces a mixed equilibrium in the tendering subgame in which the second mover acquires just half the shares or votes. This enables the second mover to o¤er a premium above the true value. The …rst mover cannot do so for fear of having to pay the premium to all shareholders. So, the second mover can e¤ectively mimic the e¤ect of a quantity restriction even when it cannot be explicitly imposed. The source of the advantage is R's ability to make a preemptive o¤er to buy votes.
Even when w I is far greater than w R beating such a preemptive o¤er would result in a loss for I. The fact that such a response would result in a loss for R as well does not help I since R's o¤er is already in place. For R's preemptive o¤er to be successful b R must be more than twice b I . This is because I can again use its second-mover ability to induce a mixed equilibrium in which it buys only half the shares and hence can o¤er premium of up to 2b I over their public value. In contrast, when b I > 2b R and w R + b R > w I + 2b I , I cannot win pro…tably. In this case R can o¤er to buy shares at p s R = w I + 2b I + " against which I has no pro…table response. Again it is obvious that no o¤er p s I for shares can be bene…cial to I. An o¤er with p v I < 2b I attracts no shareholders, while an o¤er of p v I > 2b I induces an equilibrium in the subgame with shareholders tendering to both in which I's pro…t is
Shareholder pro…ts
The total surplus, w j + b j , is a potentially controversial measure of social welfare, since the private bene…t b j might represent at least in part illicit gains. We therefore also examine the e¤ect of vote trading on shareholders' payo¤s. The comparison of payo¤s across the di¤erent regimes is sometimes ambiguous due to the presence of multiple equilibria: when I wins in equilibrium, the payo¤s to I and to the shareholders depend on R's initial actions, and R is indi¤erent among a wide range of actions. However, even when the comparison is unambiguous, it can go either way: the introduction of separate vote trading sometimes enhances and sometimes harms shareholders payo¤s.
For example, when w I + b I > w R > w I and b R > min fw I w R + 2b I ; b I g contender R wins whether or not votes can be traded separately, but shareholders payo¤s with vote trading (min fw I + 2b I ; w R + b I g) are larger than without it (w I + b I ). The intuition behind this observation is that vote trading bene…ts the shareholders because it forces R to make a more aggressive o¤er. When votes cannot be traded, for R to win it must o¤er p s R = w I + b I . When votes can be traded, if R simply o¤ers p s R = w I +b I , then I can respond with p v I = b I " and, for su¢ ciently small ", will win pro…tably with probability close to 1 (the equilibrium in the tendering subgame following these o¤ers is mixed). Therefore, R must either o¤er 
Restricted o¤ers
The change from the previous analysis is that the contenders are allowed to make restricted o¤ers that cap the quantities of shares and/or votes that they will buy at the prices they announce. That is, a contender is committed to buy at the price it announced any quantity tendered to it up to the pre-announced quota. Intuitively, it seems that such a cap should enable contenders to o¤er higher premiums over the public value of the shares, since by capping the quantity they would not have to pay this premium to all shareholders. It therefore should bias the outcome in favor of contenders with higher private bene…ts. This intuition is indeed con…rmed by the following analysis.
Only shares
First consider the case in which votes can be transferred only by trading shares. As before, the rival has to acquire a majority of the shares to take control. An o¤er f j by contender
. This is a commitment to buy at the price p The main intuition of the following analysis is that, since the winning contender can cap its o¤er at half the shares, it can bid up to w j + 2b j and still break even. Therefore, we expect that I wins if w I + 2b I > w R + 2b R and R wins if the reverse inequality holds strictly.
Theorem 3 In all equilibria the contender with the higher value of w j + 2b j wins.
The proof is in the appendix and again follows the logic of …rst ruling out equilibria with 2 (0; 1).
Both votes and shares
An o¤er f j by j = R; I is a four-tuple f j = p Theorem 4 The identity of the winner is the same as in Theorem 3 except for parameter con…gurations satisfying w I + 2b I > w R + 2b R and b R > b I . For these con…gurations I is the e¢ cient contestant and would be the winner in the absence of vote trading, but R wins when vote trading is allowed.
The proof is in the appendix and its logic is again as in previous cases. It is argued …rst that in all equilibria 6 2 (0; 1). Then for each region of the parameter space either = 0 or = 1 is ruled out which implies (via existence) that the remaining case prevails in equilibrium.
First and second mover advantages
The results above show that with restricted o¤ers there is only a …rst-mover advantage (and no second-mover advantage). This is consistent with the reason for the second-mover advantage when restricted o¤ers are not possible. There we argued that the second-mover advantage results from the ability of the second mover to create a mixed equilibrium in the tendering subgame in which the second mover obtains half the votes, but that the …rst mover cannot do so for fear of having to pay all the shareholders. With the ability of making restricted o¤ers this limitation on the …rst mover does not exist, and the …rst mover can do exactly what the second mover achieves. Indeed the …rst mover, R, wins with restricted o¤ers in strictly more cases than he does when he cannot make restricted o¤ers.
Contingent o¤ers
In this scenario contenders are allowed to make contingent o¤ers, an o¤er which takes e¤ect if and only if the o¤ering contender wins. An o¤er by contender k = I; R for shares is a pair of prices: a contingent price p sc k at which contender k will buy all shares that were tendered to it in the event that it wins and a non-contingent price p s k at which it is committed to buy in any case. Similarly An o¤er by contender k = I; R for votes speci…es a contingent price p vc k and a non-contingent price p v k . Each of these prices stands for a contender's commitment to purchase any quantity tendered subject to the contingency. Now that we have the notation, we restate De…nition 1 of tie-free o¤ers to apply to contingent o¤ers as well: The o¤ers f R ; f I are tie-free if p 
Only Shares
Again we …rst consider the case in which only shares can be traded. An outcome of the tendering subgame is an array of the form (m ). Thus, the o¤ers are unrestricted o¤ers but they can be conditioned on winning. The main result here is that outcome is e¢ cient-the contender with the highest w k + b k wins-as in the case of non-contingent and unrestricted o¤ers for shares alone. Thus, unlike quantity restrictions this form of contingency does not interfere with e¢ ciency.
The proof is the appendix and its method is again to rule out mixed equilibria in which both contenders win with positive probability. We know from the analysis in section 4.1 that there is no such equilibrium when both contenders make non-contingent o¤ers. This conclusion is extended here to the cases in which at least one contender makes a conditional o¤er.
Both votes and shares
Now allow for votes to be traded separately. Here, an outcome of the tendering subgame is an array of the form (m The proof is in the appendix and the argument follows the same logic of ruling out mixed equilibria as in the previous proofs.
Variations on the basic model: voting in the end
In the version of the model analyzed so far, R gains control only if it acquires more than 50% of the votes. In an alternative description of the process the bidding contest is followed by a vote that determines which contender will end up in control. In such a case, R might gain control even when it does not acquire the majority of the votes. It is not entirely clear which is the "right"model. Some related contributions in the …nance literature employ the former model and some employ the latter. The rationale for using the model without the voting in the end is that to force a vote on control the raider might have to acquire a majority of the votes.
However, this question is not particularly important for our analysis, since the introduction of voting to the model would not change the results. To see this, consider a modi…ed version of the model with voting in the end. That is, once the tendering stage is over, the two contenders with the blocks they have acquired and the remaining shareholders (who have not sold their vote nor share) vote and the contender who wins this vote gains control. We will establish the claim by showing that any equilibrium outcome in the voting version has an equivalent outcome with the same winning probabilities in the game without voting. We present the argument for the environments in which the contenders can make unrestricted o¤ers for shares or for both shares and votes. It is clear that the argument can be extended to the case of restricted o¤ers as well, but this will require some additional steps and we will forgo it here.
Observe …rst that, if w R < w I , those who do not tender to R end up voting for I, so in order to win R must still acquire over 50% of votes and nothing changes in the above analysis. Consider, therefore, the case of w R > w I and a particular equilibrium in this case.
Let denote the probability with which R wins, and k denote the fraction of the total votes (with or without shares) that k = R; I ends up purchasing in this equilibrium. Clearly, if R > 1=2, this equilibrium is automatically an equilibrium in the absence of voting as well. Similarly, if = 0, this is also the case, since if R cannot deviate pro…tably when there is voting in the end, it cannot do so in the absence of voting. Finally, if > 0 and R 1=2, consider a con…guration which di¤ers from the equilibrium con…guration only in that R o¤ers an unrestricted price for shares p s R = w R + (1 )w I (i.e., the other parts of R's o¤er and those of I's o¤er are just as in the equilibrium); all the shareholders who tender shares to R or vote for R in the equilibrium sell shares to R at this p s R and all other shareholders behave as in the equilibrium. It can be veri…ed that this con…guration is an equilibrium outcome in the game without voting in the end. The shareholders who sell shares to R at p s R get the same payo¤ as those voting for R in the equilibrium and so do the shareholders who sell to I or to another part of R's o¤er. Both R and I get the same payo¤s. Clearly, R does not have a pro…table deviation, since it would be available in the equilibrium with voting as well. Similarly any pro…table deviation by I would have the same e¤ect in the equilibrium with voting. Thus, the constructed con…guration is an equilibrium con…guration in the game without voting.
Existence
In this section we prove existence of an equilibrium. The method is to consider limits of equilibria of a sequence discretized games (where the actions spaces of I and R are …nite, and there is a continuum of shareholders). The grids for the discretized games are selected so as to preclude ties (i.e., in our terminology, any pair of o¤ers in a discretized game is "tie-free").
Recall the notation f j , j = I; R; is an o¤er, F j is the set of feasible o¤ers for j, and an outcome in the tendering subgame following (f R ; ) f R ;f I consisting of the fractions of shareholders tendering shares and votes to each …rm, and the probability with which R wins. Let C (f R ; f I ) denote the set of equilibrium outcomes in the tendering subgame which are not Pareto dominated by a strict equilibrium outcome in the tendering subgame. Let u j f R ; f I ; (m; ) f R ;f I denote the payo¤ to contender j given f R , f I , and an outcome (m; ) f R ;f I in the subgame following (f R ; f I ).
F j varies across the di¤erent scenarios as follows.
In the unrestricted-shares case F j = R + is a set of p s 's (prices for shares)
In the case of unrestricted shares and votes
+ is a set of (p s ; p v ) pairs (prices for shares and for votes)
In the quantity-restricted shares case In the case of contingent o¤ers for shares and votes
+ is a pair of pairs of prices, one pair corresponds to the contingent and uncontingent o¤ers for shares and the other for votes.
First note that C is a non-empty correspondence. This follows from existence of equilibria in the shareholder subgame. Fix the o¤ers, f R ; f I . For each 2 [0; 1], de…ne the the set of tendering outcomes M ( ) that are optimal for the shareholders when they expect R to win with probability . (That is, given , if m h k > 0 then tendering h to k maximizes the shareholder's utility out of the available options, and if P k;h m h k < 1 then not tendering must be optimal.) Clearly this set of tendering outcomes is non-empty, convex valued and the correspondence M ( ) is uhc. Recall that for each outcome m 2 M ( ) the correspondence (m) de…nes the set of 's that are consistent with m. (That is, if R's share of the votes at that outcome is strictly smaller than 1=2 or strictly larger than 1=2, then the resulting set is f0g or f1g respectively; if R's share of the votes is exactly 1=2 then the resulting set is [0; 1].) So (M ( )) de…nes a non-empty, convex valued, uhc correspondence whose …xed point is an equilibrium value of for the tendering subgame. This implies that the set of all equilibrium outcomes (m; ) f R ;f I in the tendering subgame following (f R ; f I ) is non empty, and obviously C (f R ; f I ) is a non-empty subset. Now consider a di¤erent type of game in which we, the analysts, choose a selection of C. That is, we choose a function c de…ned on F R F I such that c (f R ; f I ) 2 C (f R ; f I ) and other than that the game is the same as the original game. We call this the new game, and the preceding version -where the shareholders get to choose any equilibrium outcome of the tendering subgame from C -the original game.
Claim 1 Given a SPE of the original game there is a selection c under which those strategies are a SPE of the new game, and conversely, given a selection c and a SPE equilibrium of the new game, we have a SPE of the original game.
Proof. Obvious. 
Proof. Obvious.
Remark 4 Note that if the set C was de…ned to include only Pareto undominated equilibrium outcomes in the tendering subgame (rather than all those that are undominated by strict equilibria of the tendering subgame), then we would not obtain UHC. Indeed, consider a game with w R > w I and a subgame after p Now de…ne another game, call it an extended game. 6 The extended game has three players. The incumbent and rival have the same strategy space, and a …ctitious third player chooses an element of R 2 . The payo¤s are as follows. I gets whatever the third player chooses for him, R gets whatever the third player chooses for him, the third player gets 1 if the vector of strategies are any element of f(f R ; f I ; U R (f R ; f I ); U I (f R ; f I ))g F R F I R 2 and is a continuous function that strictly decreases as the strategies move away from that set. The payo¤s for I and R are trivially continuous. The payo¤s for the third player are continuous if (and only if) both U k 's are uhc.
Claim 3 A SPE of the extended game is a SPE of a new game (where we use the selection c given by the third player from the extended game), and conversely.
Claim 4 (Hellwig et. al. (1990) ) Given any sequence of …nite grids of a continuous extensive form game, and any sequence of SPE for the sequence of games, the limit of the path of those SPE is a SPE path of the limit game. (Take subsequences whenever necessary.)
Moreover, there exists a sequence of SPE of the …nite games converging to the SPE of the limit game.
Proof. The …rst claim is Theorem 1 in Hellwig et. al. (1990) . The second claim follows from their discussion of lower hemi continuity (p. 419).
Our existence result now follows from the above arguments.
Proposition 1 In each of the scenarios considered in this paper there exists a SPE whose outcome is a limit of SPE outcomes in a sequence of discretized versions of the game converging to the original game.
6 We thank Phil Reny for this idea.
Proof. Take a sequence of …nite-grid games G n converging to the original game, and take any convergent sequence of outcomes e n such that e n is a SPE of G n . Any such outcome e n is also a SPE outcome of an extended version of G n (by the construction above). Hence, the extended version of the limit game has a SPE and furthermore the sequence e n converges to the outcome of that SPE (by Hellwig et. al. (1990) ). The SPE that supports that outcome in the extended version of the limit game is a SPE of the original game that has the same outcome (by the construction above).
We conclude by claiming that (robust) equilibria exists. First we make a trivial observation that follows from the de…nition of robustness.
Claim 5 Fix a sequence of grids without ties,
o is a sequence of (robust) equilibria with f
Proof. This is just a restatement of the de…nition of robust equilibrium.
Proposition 2 A robust equilibrium exists in all the games considered in this paper.
Proof. Follows from Claims 4 and 5 and Proposition 1.
Remark 5 Notice that the set of (robust) equilibrium outcomes is contained in the set of outcomes of SPE that satisfy the tie-free part of the robustness de…nition and such that,
is not an element of C (f R ; f I ) because it is Pareto dominated by a strict equilibrium, say (m;^ ) in the tendering subgame, then it will also fail robustness. To see this recall that robustness requires (f Lemma 3 There is no equilibrium in which both contenders have a strictly positive probability of winning, i.e., there is no equilibrium with 2 (0; 1).
Proof. Note that in any equilibrium with 2 (0; 1) contender R purchases half the votes (with or without the shares), and the shareholders are indi¤erent. As in the proof of Lemma 1, robustness implies that, in any equilibrium, it cannot be that some shareholders sell some shares to I and some to R because any tie-free o¤ers near (p 
and so 
Notice that u I describes the pro…t at the purported mixed equilibrium. Moreover, for other R's payo¤ at the purported equilibrium is
which is increasing in p 
which is linear and increasing in p (7) and (8) 
Proofs for subsection 5.1
Proof. First we observe that, without loss of generality we can restrict attention to I's o¤ers (p ; 1
Therefore, there exists an equilibrium in the tendering subgame following (p 
1=2.
It cannot be that m s I = 1=2 and that I is over-subscribed because then fewer than 1=2 tender to R and I wins. If m s R = 1=2 and R is oversubscribed then R wins (by our speci…cation above -see remark 1). But then it cannot be that shareholders are selling shares to both I and R since this is ruled out by the tie-free part of the robustness requirement. Thus shareholders must be indi¤erent between selling to R and not tendering at all, implying that p s R = w R + (1 )w I . Let u j denote the pro…t of j = I; R in the putative equilibrium with 2 (0; 1).
Consider the following two con…gurations of parameters. Suppose then that 2 (0; 1), so that (15) and (16) 1=2 which implies that nobody would tender to R since tendering to I is more pro…table). Letû I denote I's pro…t following this deviation:û
where the …rst inequality follows from the assumption w I + 2b I > w R + 2b R . Thus, I
can deviate pro…tably from the putative equilibrium with 2 (0; 1). Together with the previous observation that < 1, we have that there is no equilibrium with > 0.
Combining this with the result on existence we conclude that with these parameters = 0.
2. Suppose w I + 2b I < w R + 2b R and that < 1. It may not be the case that = 0, since and (15) and (16) hold. Since it is an equilibrium, I cannot pro…tably outbid R with
. That is,
Since p s R = w R + (1 )w I , this implies
If w I +2b I > w R , it follows that u I > (1 )b I in contradiction to (15). If w I +2b I w R , then 2 (0; 1) may not arise in equilibrium, since p s0 R > w R would guarantee R a win with pro…t b R + w R p s0 R . But, forp s R su¢ ciently close to w R , b R + w R p s R > b R u R in contradiction to equilibrium. Therefore, 2 (0; 1) cannot arise in equilibrium. Thus there is no equilibrium with < 1. Combining this with the result on existence we conclude that with these parameters = 1.
Proofs for subsection 5.2
Theorem 4 The identity of the winner is the same as in Theorem 3 except for parameter con…gurations satisfying w I + 2b I > w R + 2b R and b R > b I . For these con…gurations I is the e¢ cient contestant and would be the winner in the absence of vote trading, but R wins when vote trading is allowed.
Proof. The proof follows from the subsequent characterization of equilibrium outcomes and existence. By Lemma 4 and existence 2 f0; 1g. Propositions 5 and 6 preclude either = 0 or = 1 for all possible con…gurations of the parameters.
Before proving that in equilibrium 6 2 (0; 1) it is useful to establish that it su¢ ces to restrict attention only to a subset of the possible o¤ers, speci…cally to I making an o¤er Lemma 4 There is no equilibrium in which both R and I have a strictly positive probability of winning, i.e., there is no equilibrium with 2 (0; 1). 1=2. In both cases R has losses, so there is no such equilibrium.
Proofs for subsection 6.1
The following lemma narrows down the set of scenarios that have to be considered.
Lemma 5 Given any robust equilibrium with outcome there is a robust equilibrium with outcome when we restrict attention to the case where I makes only uncontingent o¤ers, and R does not make both types of o¤ers, only one.
Proof. We …rst argue that wlog attention can be restricted to the case where I makes only uncontingent o¤ers. Consider then the case in which I makes a contingent o¤er p sc I . In a mixed equilibrium of the tendering subgame the shareholders would be indi¤erent either between tendering to R and to I or between tendering to R and just holding on to the shares.
In the former case the payo¤ to a shareholder from tendering to I would be I + w R , the above outcome will continue to be an equilibrium of the tendering subgame. That is, the probability of R's win will continue to be , a fraction will tender to I and those tendering to I and those who do not will receive the same payo¤. I's payo¤ will be (1
) just as before. Thus, in a mixed equilibrium, without loss of generality, we may assume that I is con…ned to making only non-contingent o¤ers. So it is enough to examine contingent o¤ers only by
R.
The Pareto dominance part of the re…nement might rule out an equilibrium with 2 (0; 1) under p . The constructed equilibrium will satisfy the tie-free requirement as well since ties were not used in the construction, so if one happens to be created nearby actions will be tie-free and have approximately the same .
When 2 f0; 1g it is obvious that I can be con…ned to non-contingent o¤ers wlog-if without being con…ned I loses then I continues to lose with a restricted strategy space; if without being con…ned I wins with probability 1 then the contingent o¤er is equivalent to an uncontingent o¤er. Clearly in these cases the new strategies constitute a (robust) equilibrium. Now we argue that wlog attention can be restricted to the case where R does not make both contingent and non-contingent o¤ers, just one of the two. If 2 (0; 1), shareholders must be indi¤erent between R's contingent o¤er and I's uncontingent o¤er (since the tie-free part of the robustness implies that they do not tender to the uncontingent o¤ers of both) and hence they must prefer these to R's uncontingent o¤er (i.e., p
and no shares are tendered to R at p s R ). Hence R's contingent o¤er is what shareholders tender to so the uncontingent o¤er by R is then irrelevant. If R loses with probability 1 then restricting R's strategy space is clearly wlog. If R wins with probability 1 then replacing any contingent o¤er with an uncontingent one will not change shareholder or I's behavior.
That the constructed equilibrium is robust is obvious.
Proof. The method of the proof is again to rule out mixed equilibria in which both contenders win with positive probability. Recall that in such a putative mixed equilibrium the shareholders are just indi¤erent about tendering to R and exactly half tender to R. We know from the analysis in section 4.1 that there is no such equilibrium when both contenders make non-contingent o¤ers. We have now to extend this conclusion to the cases in which at least one contender makes a conditional o¤er and the shareholders are indi¤erent between such an o¤er and an alternative.
Consider therefore the case in which R makes a contingent o¤er p sc R and I responds with a non-contingent o¤er p s I . In a mixed equilibrium of the tendering subgame, it may not be that p sc R < w I , since then this outcome would fail robustness due to Pareto domination by the strict equilibrium in the subgame in which shareholders hold on to their shares. Therefore, p sc R w I . In a mixed equilibrium of the subgame the shareholders would be indi¤erent either between tendering to R and tendering to I or between tendering to R and just holding on to the shares. The latter case is ruled out since it implies p sc R + (1 ) w I = w R + (1 ) w I , hence p sc R = w R , which is not consistent with 2 (0; 1) and the tie-free condition of robustness.
In the former case p Before proving that in all equilibria 6 2 (0; 1), we present a result analogous to Lemma 5 showing that for our purposes we can restrict attention to a subset of the strategy space.
Lemma 6 The equilibrium value of is unchanged if we restrict attention to the case where I makes only uncontingent o¤ers, and R does not make both contingent and uncontingent o¤ers for shares, nor both contingent and uncontingent o¤er for votes, i.e., p , the same outcome will continue to be an equilibrium of the tendering subgame. This is because given the same those tendering to I and those who do not will receive the same payo¤ and I's payo¤ will be (1
Lemma 7 With conditional (but unrestricted) o¤ers for shares and votes there is no equilibrium in which I and R both have a strictly positive probability of winning, i.e., there is no equilibrium with 2 (0; 1).
Proof. For 2 (0; 1) it must be that shareholders tender shares to one contender and votes to the other.
The tendering of uncontingent shares both to I and to R is precluded by the tie-free part of the robustness. Tendering of uncontingent shares to I and contingent shares to R is precluded by the following argument. If this were the case we would have p Finally, there cannot be an equilibrium with 2 (0; 1) in which some shareholders tender to R and some do not tender at all. The impossibility of some not tendering and some tendering shares for uncontingent prices was demonstrated in Lemma 1. That they cannot be indi¤erent between selling votes at uncontingent or contingent prices and not tendering is obvious. The possibility of some tendering to a contingent o¤er by R and some not tendering when p cs R = w R is ruled our by the tie-free part of the robustness requirement.
Given that wlog contenders do not make both a conditional and unconditional o¤er for shares nor make both conditional and unconditional o¤ers for votes, the preceding discussion implies that if 2 (0; 1) then one of the following must hold. ii. Given any equilibrium of this type with some 2 (0; 1) we can construct an equilibrium of type 1 with p v I = (1 ) p vc I since then payo¤s to shareholders and to I and R are the same. Since no equilibrium of type 1 with 2 (0; 1) exists, the same conclusion applies to equilibria of type 2. (There is also a simple direct argument: p sc R > w R since otherwise no one sells to R. Since w R > w I all selling to R -which is an equilibrium of the tendering subgame -is better than any payo¤ with 2 (0; 1) so by the Pareto undomination part of the robustness requirement 6 2 (0; 1). The case of 2 (0; 1) arising due to p sc R = w R is ruled out by the tie-free part of the robustness requirement.
iii. This situation is identical to the case studied in Lemma 3 of 2 (0; 1) without conditional o¤ers, and therefore is not feasible for 2 (0; 1).
iv. The same argument as in case 2, but applied to case 3, implies that there is no equilibrium with 2 (0; 1) in case 4.
We turn now to cases 5-8. As discussed in Lemma 3 w R > w I implies that the Pareto undomination part of the robustness requirement selects the equilibrium in the tendering subgame where all sell to R. So we consider w I > w R .
v. Assume there is an interior solution for (otherwise we are done with this step). 
